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PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT IN THE
MULTINATIONAL SECURITIES MARKET
DONALD K. CHARTER* AND STANLEY M. BECK, Q.C.**
1. INTRODUCTION
Regulators are faced with a growing number of problems as a re-
sult of the internationalization of capital markets. The general view is
that the emergence of the "international" market is beneficial for the
world economy because it provides increased access to capital for eco-
nomic development and creates more efficient markets. A loss of confi-
dence in the integrity of international markets due to abusive transac-
tions will, accordingly, impact on capital formation. There is therefore
a very real and urgent need to ensure that these markets are properly
regulated to maintain liquidity, continuity, and confidence.
The facilities which permit investors access to foreign markets and
corporations access to world capital can be used by those engaged in
illegal conduct to hide transactions through the use of multiple jurisdic-
tions and institutions and the channeling of transactions to jurisdictions
with blocking and/or secrecy legislation.
The most effective manner for a jurisdiction to prevent capital
market crime is to deny access to non-residents. This, obviously, would
have a chilling effect on the internationalization of such markets. The
preferable approach is to create methods of detecting, investigating, and
prosecuting improper conduct, regardless of jurisdiction.
The economic crimes involved include conduct such as fraud and
the laundering of profits from illegal activity, as well as securities law
breaches such as insider trading and market manipulation.
1.1. Hypothetical Cases
Two hypothetical fact situations have been provided to which this
paper is addressed:
1. The first situation involves the disclosure of improper
earnings for a foreign subsidiary in a Securities and Ex-
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change Commission (SEC) filing. These earnings were al-
leged to be the result of the falsification of earnings by un-
known individuals in the foreign subsidiary. The effect was
to avoid disclosure of unfavorable results. The SEC exam-
ines the situation but requires documents located at the for-
eign subsidiary as well as testimony from foreign-based
officers.
2. The second situation involves an allegation of insider
trading with respect to trades placed through the foreign of-
fice of a United States registrant prior to the announcement
of a merger. The dealer conducting the trades is located in
the same foreign country in which negotiations for the
merger occurred. The SEC needs to obtain the trading
records of the dealer and examine the dealer and persons
making the trades as well as the individuals taking part in
the merger negotiations. The SEC also requires documents,
such as telephone records, from third parties.
1.2. Issues
In the context of these two hypothetical situations, three specific
questions are to be addressed:
1. the extent and basis of foreign resistance to SEC en-
forcement needs;
2. possible modes of negotiation of needed assistance
agreements; and,
3. the need for a multinational regulatory system.
The papers prepared by Messrs. Greene and Pitt provide an ex-
tensive analysis of the implications of these two fact situations under
United States law. They also provide a review of the powers of the
SEC in investigating these matters, the problems encountered in other
jurisdictions and the requirements of the SEC in investigating these
types of cases. This paper will not address these matters as they are a
matter of United States law.
2. REASONS FOR RESISTING SEC ENFORCEMENT NEEDS
As can be observed from Mr. Pitt's paper, United States securities
laws purport to have extraterritorial application, and the United States
courts have been aggressive in taking jurisdiction over activities occur-
ring outside the geographical boundaries of the United States. This
claim of jurisdiction by the United States, both in its legislation and by
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its courts, is justified by what is known as the "impact theory." Under
this theory, no matter where the conduct at issue occurs, if it has suffi-
cient effect on United States trading markets, then the United States is
justified in claiming jurisdiction and applying United States laws re-
gardless of the laws of any other jurisdiction.
Although the impact theory is only one basis for claiming jurisdic-
tion, it is the most prevalent basis the United States uses to justify the
extraterritorial application of its laws. This approach, of course, ig-
nores the concerns of the other jurisdiction which may have a valid
concern with the conduct assailed. There may be situations where the
effects of the conduct in question are sufficiently great in the United
States to merit the United States' application of its laws extraterritori-
ally. Equally, there will be situations where the concerns of the other
jurisdiction will be greater in which case United States laws should not
apply. The problem is that each jurisdiction may view the case differ-
ently. Moreover, as national economies are increasingly interrelated,
the impact theory will become an even more expansive doctrine.
When the United States attempts to apply its laws to persons or to
conduct in other jurisdictions, it often will be viewed by that other ju-
risdiction as an infringement of sovereignty. The cornerstone for deter-
mining jurisdiction is the territorial theory. This provides that a coun-
try has complete and exclusive jurisdiction over conduct occurring
within its boundaries and over persons located therein. The impact the-
ory is the exception to this general rule. The courts or government of
the other jurisdiction will recognize United States jurisdiction only if, in
its opinion, the intrusion upon its sovereignty is justified. This is a de-
termination that the foreign jurisdiction must make itself. Any determi-
nation by United States authorities is not binding upon the foreign ju-
risdiction in any way.
Other jurisdictions are less likely to accept the extraterritorial ap-
plication of United States law when that law is in the area of economic
regulation. The history of United States enforcement of its antitrust
laws provides the best example of how jurisdictional conflicts can arise.
The United States has maintained that it has the right to regulate ac-
tivities in any nation which affect competition in the United States. Ca-
nada, however, has not accepted the impact theory as a proper basis for
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
In March of 1947, by direction of the Attorney General of the
United States, subpoenas were issued pursuant to United States anti-
trust laws against fifty Canadian pulp and paper companies and cer-
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tain officers.1 The subpoenas were under the heading "The President
of the United States of America," and were intended to compel evidence
before a Grand Inquest. The evidence sought regarded Canadian com-
panies doing business in Canada except to the extent they exported
newsprint to the United States. As discussed later, the Business Records
Protection Act (Business Records Act) (Ontario)2 was enacted to specif-
ically block compliance with these subpoenas.3 The Ontario govern-
ment found this unilateral action by the United States to be an unac-
ceptable affront to its sovereignty.
The issue of the application of United States law beyond United
States borders concerns the subject matter jurisdiction over the alleged
conduct. This issue will, however, also affect the willingness of a juris-
diction to assist the United States in investigating such conduct.
Although Ontario may not be the best example to use in reviewing
the reasons for not assisting the SEC due to its long history of close
cooperation with the SEC, this paper will consider the response of On-
tario and the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) to the enforcement
needs of the SEC.
In Ontario, without the help of the OSC or the Ontario Govern-
ment, the SEC will have substantial difficulty in obtaining the informa-
tion it requires. If the person or corporation has no assets in the United
States which would permit the SEC to bring coercive pressure to bear
on Ontario entities, the SEC has no independent ability to compel the
evidence. If the SEC commences court proceedings, it can use the pro-
cedure known as "letters of request" (formerly known as "letters roga-
tory"). This is a formal request from the United States court to the
Ontario court for assistance. Pursuant to this request, the Ontario court
will make a determination as to whether or not it is an appropriate case
for assistance. This process is slow, however, and is only applicable to
obtaining evidence for purposes of trial. The process is of little use in
an investigation context since, in the preliminary stages of an investiga-
tion, it is unlikely that the SEC would have sufficient facts to com-
mence any type of action. The usual problem for the SEC is that it is
unable to get the preliminary information that it needs to evaluate
whether or not it should bring proceedings. Therefore, as a practical
matter, there is no option for the SEC other than to seek the assistance
of the OSC.
1 This factual situation is taken from Legislature of Ontario Debates, 22 Parl. (3d
sess.), 11 George VI (1947), 946. See infra text accompanying notes 16, 17 and 18.
2 Business Records Protection Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 56 (1980) [hereinafter
Business Records Act].
I See infra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
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The OSC has a tradition of providing assistance to the SEC when
requested, on the basis of an informal arrangement. This informal ar-
rangement operates on a case-by-case basis and can be attributed to the
fact that there is significant similarity in the securities laws and a simi-
larity of philosophy of regulation of the two jurisdictions. In fact, this
cooperation was formalized as a result of the linkage of the Toronto
Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange. When this link was
negotiated, both the OSC and the SEC were concerned that proper
measures be put into place to ensure that the necessary surveillance
could be carried out and that the information could be obtained. The
OSC and the SEC exchanged letters through which there was an ac-
knowledgement of the reciprocal intention to assist one another through
information gathering and sharing.
4
2.1. The Investigatory Powers of the OSC
In spite of this willingness to assist, there are certain limitations on
the ability of the OSC to provide the requested assistance. Some of
these limitations are familiar to the SEC as problems they face in as-
sisting other jurisdictions. Before addressing these constraints, however,
a brief description of the investigatory powers of the OSC is necessary.
The OSC has extensive investigative powers which are available to
assist the SEC with investigations of cross-border transactions. The En-
forcement and Market Regulation Branch of the OSC conducts infor-
mal investigations based on staff review of documents filed, spot audits,
daily market surveillance and information or complaints from industry
participants and the general public. Although evidence is obtained on a
voluntary basis at this stage, the OSC's experience has been that parties
cooperate and provide requested information. In certain circumstances,
the OSC may appoint a staff member to audit the financial affairs of a
registrant or reporting issuer.
If the Enforcement Branch is resisted in its efforts to obtain infor-
mation necessary to determine whether violations have occurred, the
OSC may issue a formal order of investigation. A formal order may be
made where it appears that there has been a breach of the Securities
Act (Ontario),' a criminal offense has been committed under the Crimi-
nal Code6 in connection with a trade in securities, where the due ad-
ministration of the Securities Act (Ontario) so requires, or in order to
4 See Pitt, Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational Securities Market, this
issue, p. 413 and accompanying note 160.
' Securities Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 466 (1980) [hereinafter Securities Act
(Ontario)].
6 The Criminal Code, R.S.C. ch. C-34 (1970).
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investigate any matter relating to trading in securities.
Those named in the formal order are granted the power to compel
witnesses to attend, to give evidence under oath and to produce docu-
ments. The OSC may authorize an audit of the subject party's affairs,
freeze the property and assets of the subject party, institute administra-
tive proceedings, prosecute for an offense, or seek a compliance order
from the court. In some cases, the OSC will participate with other se-
curities administrators and law enforcement agencies in an investigation
and may refer matters for criminal prosecution.
The OSC's extensive investigatory powers under the Securities Act
(Ontario) only extend to compelling the evidence of witnesses and the
production of documents by persons within Ontario. The OSC, how-
ever, has a close working relationship with the securities administrators
in other provinces and territories of Canada. Information may be ob-
tained and shared interprovincially on an informal or formal basis. In
the latter case, OSC staff may participate in the investigation author-
ized by a formal order issued by an extraprovincial securities adminis-
trator. Accordingly, the OSC would be able to assist the SEC in ob-
taining relevant documents located either in Ontario or in other
provinces and territories of Canada by relying on its long-standing rela-
tionships with other Canadian securities regulators.
2.2. Difficulties in Obtaining a Formal Order Solely to Assist the
SEC
As was stated above, the OSC's investigatory powers are con-
strained by the terms of the Securities Act (Ontario). The ability to
compel evidence depends upon the issue of a formal investigation order.
This can only be issued by the OSC for the reasons previously listed.
Although the issue has not been resolved, there could be an argument
that the OSC cannot obtain a formal investigation order solely for the
purpose of assisting the SEC. Thus, difficulty could arise where the
conduct under investigation involves solely a breach of United States
laws with no Ontario connection. This problem arises as a result of the
jurisdiction given to the OSC under the Securities Act (Ontario) rather
than through any lack of desire by the OSC to provide assistance to the
SEC.
It is possible that an investigation order could be based upon a
breach of United States securities laws as a matter relating to trading
in securities generally. That argument, however, is very tenuous. The
OSC has indicated in a policy statement that registrants who breach the
securities laws of another jurisdiction can be subject to an investigation
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into their fitness for continued registration in Ontario.7 This policy
stance could give the OSC sufficient nexus to issue a formal investiga-
tion order, however, only with respect to Ontario registrants.
In broader terms, the OSC has indicated that the ability to trade
in Ontario is a privilege, not a right. The OSC has the power to deny
trading exemptions8 to any person if it deems a denial to be in the
public interest. Again, improper conduct in another jurisdiction might
be sufficient reason for an investigation into whether a person's exemp-
tions to trade in Ontario should be denied. The OSC has also stated
that it is prepared to issue a "cease trade" order in Ontario against an
issuer who has been "cease traded" in another jurisdiction for failure to
meet reporting or disclosure requirements.'
It is difficult for the OSC to use its investigative powers solely to
provide assistance to the SEC. There may, however, be sufficient rea-
son to permit such an investigation, even when the conduct alleged is
solely a breach of United States law. The matter has not been tested in
Ontario's courts and is not free from doubt. The OSC could be open to
challenge if it attempted to compel evidence pursuant to a formal order
to assist the SEC. The person subject to such investigation could seek
injunctive relief to prevent disclosure on the grounds specified above.
The ability of the OSC to provide such information is obviously subject
to the jurisdiction of the courts. In addition, the investigation is gov-
erned by the laws generally applicable in Ontario with respect to the
collection of evidence.
With respect to the problem of a formal order to assist the SEC,
the Securities Act (Quebec)1° specifically provides that the Quebec Se-
curities Commission has the authority to order an investigation with
respect to the contravention of the securities legislation of another legis-
lative authority. The OSC is currently preparing a series of amend-
ments to the Securities Act (Ontario) and will consider whether or not
this type of specific authority should be included.
7 National Policy No. 17, Violations of Securities Laws of Other Jurisdictions -
Conduct Affecting Fitness for Continued Registration, published in 3 Can. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) T 470-017.
' Pursuant to the Securities Act (Ontario), supra note 5, no person can trade in
securities unless the person is (a) a registrant or (b) has an exemption for the trade.
This includes the right to place trades through a registrant. Consequently, a denial of
exemptions effectively prevents that person from making any trades in the province.
" Ontario Securities Commission Policy No. 1.4, Reciprocal Enforcement of Cease
Trading Orders, published in 3 Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 471-104.
10 Securities Act, QUE. REv. STAT. ch. V-1 (1977) [hereinafter Securities Act
(Quebec)].
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2.3. Complications with United States Rules of Evidence
The SEC must be conscious of the rules of evidence of the United
States when obtaining information from the OSC in an effort to avoid
information being inadmissible in an American court. This issue arose
in a case of OSC assistance where the SEC wanted to be present at an
examination conducted by the OSC. However, due to the confidential-
ity requirement of a formal investigation, the OSC was of the view that
the individual representing the SEC should be named in the investiga-
tion order. The SEC, to the contrary, did not want to be named be-
cause it would then be necessary to provide the witness the United
States constitutional right to protection from self-incrimination.
In a similar vein is the decision of In Re Campbell v. Bell.1 An
investigation by the British Columbia Superintendent of Brokers was
being conducted concurrently with an independent United States inves-
tigation. The witness wanted to be assured that his evidence would not
be disclosed to the United States authorities on the basis that it was
self-incriminating. The British Columbia court required that the wit-
ness answer the questions asked and ruled that the Superintendent of
Brokers had the authority to disclose the testimony obtained to United
States authorities. This type of situation is offensive in that it allows
the SEC to obtain information under oath without providing the same
level of protection that would be required in the United States. This
could affect the type of information that the OSC would give the SEC
and could also lead to further challenges in the courts.
2.4. Ontario Blocking Statutes
In addition to these abovementioned constraints, there are also cer-
tain blocking statutes applicable in Ontario. Although in the final anal-
ysis these statutes would not appear to prevent the OSC-from providing
its assistance or disclosing information to the SEC, a brief description is
merited. These statutes must be addressed when information is dis-
closed and in order to obtain an indication as to the reaction of the
federal and provincial governments as to the extraterritorial application
of United States laws. There are three statutes to consider: the Business
Records Act;' 2 the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (FEMA);'
3
and, the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act
22 99 D.L.R.3d 322 (1979).
12 Business Records Act, supra note 2.
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(FIPPA).' 4
The Business Records Act was enacted in 1947 specifically in re-
action to a United States grand jury's issuing subpoenas against fifty
Canadian pulp and paper companies and their executive officers, all of
whom were in Ontario, to further a United States antitrust investiga-
tion. 5 When this act was presented for first reading, the Honorable
George A. Drew stated that the action by the United States:
implies the right of the Government of the United States to
invade the territorial integrity of Canada without application
to the Canadian Government, to any provincial government,
to any Canadian Court, or to any established channel of in-
ternational representation in regard to international business
16
. . . These proceedings are particularly improper in view of
the fact that we have our own Anti-Combine [antitrust] laws
in Canada under which there are just as wide powers to pre-
vent improper combinations in restraint of trade as are con-
tained in the Anti-Trust laws of the United States .... T
. . . This government objects very strongly to fishing expedi-
tions through our own Courts, and it is certainly not pre-
pared to approve of fishing expeditions of this nature into
the affairs of our companies through the Courts of the
United States in regard to something which is not properly
before these Courts. s
Clearly, Ontario did not accept the United States claim to jurisdiction
over Canadian companies. Ontario does indicate, however, that the On-
tario Government is open to diplomatic or agreed solutions to these
problems.
The Business Records Act provides that no person shall, pursuant
to or in a manner consistent with any requirement of any authority
outside Ontario, send specified records outside Ontario. There are no
reported cases which apply to the Business Records Act. It appears to
14 Bill 34, An Act to Provide for Freedom of Information and Individual Pri-
vacy, 2d Sess., 33d Leg. Ont., 34-35 Eliz. 11 1986-87 [hereinafter FIPPA].
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be aimed at the involuntary removal of records from Ontario. The pro-
vision of information on a voluntary basis pursuant to an informal SEC
investigation does not involve any requirement of an authority outside
Ontario and would not appear to be pursuant to or consistent with any
such requirement.
If a formal investigation is being conducted by the SEC, then the
provision of information pursuant to a request from the SEC could be
considered as being consistent with the requirement of a foreign au-
thority. If, however, the SEC has requested the information from the
OSC and the OSC considered it appropriate to obtain the information
and to supply it to the SEC, the Government of Ontario has had the
opportunity to consider the matter and, therefore, the mischief com-
plained of in enacting the Business Records Act is not present. It can
also be argued that such disclosure would fall within the exemption
that permits disclosure provided for by any law of Ontario (in this case
the Securities Act (Ontario)) or of the Parliament of Canada. Accord-
ingly, it is not likely that this statute would prevent the OSC from
assisting the SEC and from providing information. The statute is in-
tended to prevent United States authorities from taking unilateral ac-
tion and, as such, will only operate to stop the SEC from conducting a
direct formal investigation.
FEMA came into force on February 14, 1985. It empowers the
Attorney General of Canada to prohibit the disclosure to a foreign tri-
bunal of certain records which exist in Canada where, in the opinion of
the Attorney General, a foreign tribunal is exercising or is proposing to
exercise jurisdiction in a manner that has or is likely to adversely affect
significant Canadian interests or that otherwise has infringed or is
likely to infringe Canadian sovereignty.
The Minister of Justice, in explaining the purpose of the Act, em-
phasized that FEMA is a "mechanism of last resort" and would be
used "if there are outstanding problems which arise principally from
the extraterritorial application of United States law which United
States and Canadian officials cannot [otherwise] handle in a satisfactory
manner."
9
In the Senate debates, the Honorable Nathan Nurgitz identified
three previous instances where Canada had grappled with extraterrito-
riality issues.20 The first instance involved the uranium cartel investiga-
tion where there were allegations that the Canadian Government itself
had sanctioned an illegal cartel. In this situation there was some pres-
19 128 PARL. DEB. (No. 20), H.C. (1st ser.) 1181 (Dec. 13, 1984).
20 130 PARL. DEB. (No. 18), Senate (1st ser.) 359 (Dec. 18, 1984).
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sure to disclose secret government information to the United States.
The second instance involved the Siberian pipeline sanctions of the
United States. The United States directive was politically motivated
and was aimed at economic arrangements which Canadian corporations
might enter into for the economic benefit of Canadians, but with which
those corporations with an American affiliate might be loath to proceed.
The third instance involved a drug investigation and money laun-
dering. The Bank of Nova Scotia was confronted with either violating
Cayman Island bank secrecy laws or with disregarding an order of a
United States Federal Court.
Senator Nurgitz stated that "cooperation and consultation" would
be the preferred routes for resolving any extraterritorial disputes. 2
FEMA would be used "defensively and as a last resort, when coopera-
tion and consultation failed to resolve the policy differences involved."22
Nurgitz further commented that the Act "[was] clearly designed to pro-
tect national sovereignty in exceptional cases, after diplomatic efforts
have been exhausted and irreconcilable differences remain."23
Due to the similarity of United States and Ontario securities laws,
it is unlikely that the Attorney General of Canada would form the
opinion necessary to interfere with an exchange of information between
the OSC and the SEC pursuant to an investigation carried out in a
reasonable manner.
FIPPA has had a second reading and has been referred to commit-
tee for further discussion. Consequently, it is not known when it will be
enacted as law.
The purpose of FIPPA is expressed as twofold: (1) to provide a
right of access to government information; and (2) to protect the privacy
of individuals. With respect to information received from the SEC, the
OSC can refuse to make public disclosure provided the information was
received in confidence. The OSC may also refuse to disclose informa-
tion obtained in an OSC investigation. Of concern with respect to the
OSC's providing assistance to the SEC is the prohibition of the OSC
from disclosure of "personal information" to third parties which would
include the SEC. There are, however, a number of exemptions to the
prohibition. The relevant exception states that disclosure of personal
information is permitted:
Where disclosure is by a law enforcement institution;
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under an arrangement, a written agreement or treaty or
legislative authority, or
(ii) to another law enforcement agency in Canada.24
As currently drafted, the intention of FIPPA is to provide access
by Canadians to government files and also to protect the basic right of
an individual to privacy. However, with respect to the SEC, the right
of privacy is expressly subject to the overriding rule that investigations
by law enforcement agencies not be hindered. The net effect of FIPPA
is that providing information to the SEC is not prohibited; the provi-
sion of such information must, however, be done within the context of
FIPPA.
2.5. Practical Difficulties
In addition to the legal constraints discussed, the SEC should un-
derstand that there are more practical matters which will also affect the
ability of the OSC to provide its assistance.
Before providing the assistance to the SEC, the OSC would re-
quire that the SEC provide the OSC with the details of the SEC inves-
tigation. There are two reasons for the OSC's requirement: (1) the
OSC needs to be sure that it considers the SEC investigation proper
before lending its assistance; and, (2) the OSC would like to be aware
of possible improper conduct in Ontario to determine whether Ontario
laws have been breached and whether an OSC investigation is war-
ranted. The more that Ontario law has been contravened, the easier it
is for the OSC to justify intervention. Unfortunately, it is sometimes the
case that the SEC decides that the situation merits investigation and
does not take the time nor see the necessity for anyone else to make the
same determination.
The SEC must also be specific as to the information they require.
The gathering of information is a time consuming process. For in-
stance, a general request for all trading records requires a great deal of
time and expense on the part of the dealer. The OSC is reluctant to
make this type of request unnecessarily and thereby possibly jeopardize
its working relationship with registrants. Similarly, general requests re-
quire extensive use of OSC resources which the OSC will be reluctant
to commit if a more precise request is possible.
The SEC should approach the OSC first and not make any direct
attempt to obtain information from persons in Ontario. Once informa-
tion is gathered and forwarded by the OSC, the SEC must maintain its
24 See FIPPA, supra note 14.
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confidentiality. This confidentiality is important because the OSC will
not wish to disclose information if such information passes completely
out of its control and could thereby be used in a manner not
contemplated.
The SEC should, as a courtesy, keep the OSC advised as to the
progress of the investigation as it pertains to Ontario. If any follow-up
investigation is required, this should be conducted through the OSC as
well. In a previous situation, the OSC provided trading records to the
SEC to permit the SEC to determine who had been placing trades. The
OSC then began receiving complaints from Ontario residents that the
SEC was questioning them directly. Although the OSC is willing to
assist the SEC, it does not take the view that the SEC has the right or
that it is proper for the SEC to obtain evidence directly through an
investigation in Ontario.
The OSC has developed a strong relationship with the SEC with
respect to investigation matters and is generally willing to assist the
SEC in the most effective manner. However, the seizing of jurisdiction
by the SEC and the application of United States laws to conduct in
Canada is an encroachment upon the sovereignty of Canada. This en-
croachment creates a valid objection to United States investigations,
particularly where the result would be the application of United States
laws to Canadians for conduct in Canada sanctioned by Canadian law.
The impact theory of jurisdiction has been rejected in Canada, particu-
larly with respect to economic regulation. Although the United States
and Ontario securities laws are similar, the experience in other areas,
such as antitrust, creates a reluctance on the part of Ontario to recog-
nize impact theory jurisdiction. Also, where the conduct relates to a
breach of Ontario laws, the OSC will apply its laws and not surrender
jurisdiction to the United States.
The lack of support for the extraterritorial application of United
States laws is demonstrated by the blocking statute in Canada. The
willingness to help the United States is also demonstrated by the fact
that these statutes will not prevent cooperation. They are enacted to
ensure the protection of Canadian sovereignty. There is no advantage
to Canada to be viewed as a sanctuary for those participating in illegal
conduct.
2.6. The United States-Canada Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
A recent example of the desire of Canada to cooperate with respect
to international criminal activity is the United States-Canada Mutual
19871
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Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT).25 This Treaty will be most impor-
tant for future OSC/SEC cooperation.
The Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Govern-
ment of the United States of America on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters was signed on March 18, 1985.26 Its stated purpose
is to "improve the effectiveness of both countries in the investigation,
prosecution and suppression of crime through cooperation and mutual
assistance in law enforcement matters.1
27
MLAT provides that the United States and Canadian govern-
ments shall provide mutual legal assistance in all matters relating to the
investigation, prosecution, and suppression of offenses. "Assistance" is
defined to include examining objects and sites, exchanging information
and objects, locating or identifying persons, serving documents, taking
the evidence of persons, providing documents and records, transferring
persons in custody, and executing requests for searches and seizures.
Such assistance shall be provided without regard to whether the con-
duct under investigation or prosecution in the requesting state consti-
tutes an offense or whether such conduct may be prosecuted by the
requested state.
"Offense" is defined for Canada as an offense created by a law of
Parliament that may be prosecuted upon indictment, or an offense cre-
ated by the Legislature of a Province specified in the Annex,28 and, for
the United States, as an offense for which the statutory penalty is a
term of imprisonment of one year or more, or an offense specified in
the Annex. The Annex specifically includes securities violations. How-
ever, other assistance may be provided pursuant to other agreements,
arrangements or practices, and in respect to illegal acts that do not con-
stitute an offense within the definition.
Any request for assistance must be made under the MLAT. Thus,
only the Attorney General or officials designated by the Attorney Gen-
eral may make requests on behalf of the United States, and such re-
quests must be made only to the Minister of Justice or to officials des-
ignated by the Minister of Justice in Canada. The request is to be kept
confidential unless otherwise permitted by the requesting state.
The requested state is to promptly execute the request or, when
appropriate, to transmit it to the competent authorities, who shall make
25 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985,
United States-Canada, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1092 (1985) [hereinafter MLAT] (as of
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best efforts to execute the request. The courts of the requested state
shall have jurisdiction to issue subpoenas, search warrants or other or-
ders necessary to execute the request. A request shall be executed in
accordance with the law of the requested state and, to the extent not
prohibited by the laws of the requested state, the requested state may
require that information or evidence furnished be kept confidential or
be disclosed or be used only subject to terms and conditions it may
specify. The requesting state shall not disclose or use such information
or evidence furnished for purposes other than those stated in the re-
quest without the prior consent of the requested state.
The signing of the MLAT provides further comfort with respect
to the Canadian Federal Government's use of FEMA. This can be seen
as a further indication that FEMA was enacted only to afford protec-
tion in the future for some unforseen and unilateral intrusion upon
Canadian sovereignty. Once in force, MLAT will govern requests for
assistance from the OSC by the SEC. However, each of these agencies
can be designated under MLAT to permit direct communication. This
would be the preferable manner to administer this treaty.
3. FACT SITUATIONS
The foregoing demonstrates that, subject to some restraints, the
OSC is able to assist the SEC and, generally, is willing to provide that
assistance. The following is a discussion of the position of the OSC on
the hypotheticals provided.
3.1. Hypothetical 1: False Financial Statements
The Securities Act (Ontario) has a number of financial disclosure
requirements and the Criminal Code of Canada has antifraud
provisions.
3.1.1. Subsidiary as a Public Company
It appears that the concerns raised by the SEC indicate that there
may have been fraud in Ontario. If the subsidiary is a reporting issuer
(public company) in Ontario, then the OSC will have an immediate
interest in the case and will investigate. If preliminary facts are strong
enough, the OSC may issue a temporary cease trade order pending a
hearing. If improper financial disclosure in Ontario is shown, the OSC
will issue a permanent cease trading order pending proper disclosure. If
the improper disclosure is due to more culpable conduct, the OSC may,
pursuant to a hearing, sanction the parties involved.
If fraud is apparent, the case will be turned over to the Attorney
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General for criminal prosecution. The OSC will, therefore, be con-
ducting its own investigation, in the course of which the testimony the
SEC seeks will be compelled.
The Securities Act (Ontario) does not directly prohibit the OSC
from providing to the SEC the evidence obtained. Normally, the OSC
would be willing to provide it. However, such disclosure could be chal-
lenged in the Ontario courts by the persons involved. As was discussed,
there is no precedent for this type of challenge. The area of individual
rights is changing rapidly in Canada, due in large part to the recently
enacted Charter of Rights.29 As counsel becomes increasingly aware of
the potential to challenge this type of disclosure by the OSC, the more
likely it becomes that a challenge will occur. In fact, the current level of
cooperation now existing between the OSC and the SEC could be cur-
tailed as a result of such a challenge. Until there are developments in
.this area of law, there will be uncertainty as to the OSC's ability to
disclose this type of information. The OSC would also expect the assis-
tance of the SEC with respect to information located in the United
States relevant to the investigation in Ontario.
3.1.2. Subsidiary Not as a Public Company
If the Ontario subsidiary is not an Ontario reporting issuer (not a
public company in Ontario), then it is unlikely that the Securities Act
(Ontario) has been breached. However, the potential for fraud within
the jurisdiction still exists sufficiently for the OSC to investigate. The
OSC would normally be willing to provide the obtained information to
the SEC. Such disclosure would, however, be subject to the same possi-
ble challenge as has already been discussed. This challenge becomes
more problematic if it is necessary to compel the evidence. The OSC is
not authorized to commence a formal investigation into criminal code
offenses unless they relate to a securities trade. Once the OSC believes
that a case for fraud exists, it would approach the Attorney General to
determine how the case would proceed. At this point it would become a
criminal matter and the SEC would have to look to the law enforce-
ment agency conducting the investigation in order to obtain any evi-
dence the OSC was unable to provide.
29 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, as enacted by
Canada Act (U.K.), R.S.C. ch. 11 (1982).
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3.2. Hypothetical 2: Insider Trading
3.2.1. Public Companies
The Securities Act (Ontario) has a prohibition on insider trading
which has been recently amended. If Company X is an Ontario report-
ing issuer, then the conduct alleged would constitute a breach of Onta-
rio's securities laws. The OSC would commence an investigation into
the matter with a view to applying Ontario insider trading rules. If it
were necessary to compel evidence this would be accomplished by a
formal investigation order. The OSC would normally be willing to pro-
vide information it obtained to the SEC; however, as discussed above,
the ability of the OSC to disclose the information is subject to challenge
by the persons involved. The OSC would expect the assistance of the
SEC with respect to information relevant to the investigation located in
the United States.
3.2.2. Private Companies
If Company X is not an Ontario reporting issuer (not a public
company in Ontario), then Ontario securities laws have not been
breached. However, as indicated by the Ontario prohibition on insider
trading, the OSC finds this type of conduct offensive. The OSC would
normally be willing to provide assistance to the SEC in its investiga-
tion. The OSC would seek to obtain the required information volunta-
rily. If this were not successful, and there would be no reason for an
individual to cooperate, the use of a formal order to compel evidence
would have to be considered. As was indicated previously, there is no
clear authority in the Securities Act (Ontario) to enable the OSC to
issue a formal order for the sole purpose of assisting the SEC. The
OSC may be willing to make such an order on the basis that a breach
of United States laws by participants in the Ontario capital markets is
a valid concern of the OSC. This order, however, would be subject to
challenge by the persons affected. The challenge would involve not only
the questions of individual rights, discussed in Hypothetical 1 above,
but also the actual authority of the OSC to make the order. In this
scenario, those affected could seek recourse under FEMA on the basis
that, as there has been no breach of Ontario laws, this order would be
an unjustified encroachment on Canadian sovereignty. The willingness
of the OSC to issue the necessary order will be influenced by the per-
ceived likelihood of a valid challenge and whether or not a person's
rights under Canadian laws would be adversely affected by the order.
The outcome of the SEC investigation could result in the OSC's
determination that the individuals involved should not enjoy continued
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access to Ontario's capital markets, in which case an order denying
such individuals exemptions to trade in Ontario could issue.
It must also be noted that once the MLAT is ratified, requests for
information will have to follow the provisional guidelines. This proce-
dure includes the parties between whom the requests must be handled.
Such a procedure may expedite the cooperation if the SEC and the
OSC are designated under the MLAT by the Attorney General and
Minister of Justice, respectively, as "Central Authorities" for securities
related matters. This designation would avoid delays created by involv-
ing at least two more government agencies in the process.
4. SOLUTIONS
There are serious impediments to conducting a multijurisdictional
investigation. Problems exist even between countries with similar secur-
ities legislation, a similar philosophy of regulation and a mutual desire
to provide assistance. The solution to such problems depends on mutual
confidence and cooperation, as well as respect for national interests and
different approaches to similar problems. The SEC's investigations are
primarily aimed at the protection of the United States capital markets
and United States participants. This quite proper national approach
may, however, ignore the concerns of other jurisdictions and be viewed
as only furthering the position of the United States markets and not
that of the international marketplace.
To some extent, it can be argued that the United States, for its
own national advantage, is promoting its own capital market as the
"international marketplace." This characterization is obviously counter
to other countries' desires to have such economic activity occur within
their own borders. This concern, as well as the reluctance of nations to
accept wholeheartedly the United States' application of the impact the-
ory of securities law jurisdiction extraterritorially, must be addressed.
The experience of United States actions in other areas of economic reg-
ulation, such as in antitrust, unfortunately will have an effect on other
countries' receptiveness to United States concerns in the securities area.
The solution must lie in a negotiated approach among the coun-
tries involved. Although unilateral action by the SEC provides short
term gains in some instances, in the long term, such action will not
facilitate future cooperation and agreement. The SEC's "waiver by
conduct" proposal, whereby any person trading in the United States
would be deemed to have surrendered to United States laws and waived
any protection otherwise availed by blocking or secrecy legislation, is an
example of unilateral action which is aimed only at United States re-
quirements, and ignores any sovereign sensitivities.
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The situation which most frequently arises for the SEC is where
the person or institution possessing required information is based, or
such information is located, in a jurisdiction with blocking or secrecy
statutes. That person or institution may also have assets in the United
States. The current approach of the United States is to be very aggres-
sive in applying sanctions against the institution to force disclosure,
even though such disclosure would be unlawful in the home jurisdic-
tion. The institution is placed in the impossible position of choosing
which law to break. Again, this is a unilateral approach which ignores
the valid concerns and the sovereignty of the other jurisdiction.
The position that United States concerns are paramount is, of
course, offensive to the other country. The problem is only marginally
less acute when there are no assets in the United States because the
United States can still apply sanctions which will, in effect, bar the
person or institution from entering the United States. This approach
for obtaining immediate results is harmful to any long term hopes for
mutual cooperation.
Mr. Pitt, in his paper, demonstrated the success of a negotiated
solution to Bahamian secrecy laws when seeking information regarding
the Levine investigation. The first step is to recognize that countries
have valid reasons for their blocking and secrecy laws and that such
laws have not necessarily been enacted to provide sanctuary for those
seeking to breach the laws of other countries. Any agreement must rec-
ognize these concerns. It is equally important to recognize that other
jurisdictions have laws with respect to securities which they believe are
appropriate and which may not be similar to those laws of other juris-
dictions. The differences in securities regulation, as well as in laws
with respect to due process and evidence must be recognized and ad-
dressed in the effort to reach bilateral agreements.
Bilateral negotiations should identify and concentrate on securities
related problems and specific concerns within the area. The logical
starting point is investigatory assistance for insider trading or market
manipulation cases. Problems will still exist as to the extraterritorial
applications of law and sanctions. From the SEC perspective, however,
the ability to obtain the necessary information is paramount. Once the
SEC is able to identify a wrongdoer, even if no penalty can be brought
to bear, the individual or company can be excluded from the United
States capital markets. This exclusion, of course, applies to each
jurisdiction.
The agreements can be either bilateral or multilateral. The type of
agreement can vary. There can be formal treaties between governments,
formal agreements between governments, memoranda of understanding
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between the enforcement agencies or informal arrangements between
enforcement agencies. The SEC has been active in seeking bilateral
agreements and a number of them exist. From the SEC's point of view,
the most logical first step is to enter into as many bilateral arrange-
ments as possible. These agreements are easiest to achieve if a combina-
tion of formal agreements between governments and memoranda of un-
derstanding between enforcement agencies are used.
This is no quick fix for the SEC's needs. The long term solution
lies in the ability of the countries involved to reach a multilateral agree-
ment for multijurisdictional investigations. If four or five countries with
major capital markets are able to reach such an agreement, then it
might be possible to exclude others from participating in any of these
countries' markets without agreeing to the same rules. Again, the mul-
tilateral solution is aimed at investigatory matters and is not based on a
rationalization of securities laws.
There has also been a suggestion of a "super enforcement agency"
concept. This may be a useful concept in terms of facilitating the ex-
change of intelligence and evidence. It is not likely, however, that it
would be given a broader mandate since the question of enforcement is
still a matter of territorial jurisdiction, and is likely to remain so.
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